![]() This is fixed in 1.Īn issue was discovered in Object First 1.0.7.712. As a result, an attacker can get access to the Web UI. An attacker can predict these sequences and generate a JWT token. For signing, the JWT token uses a secret key that is generated through a function that doesn't produce cryptographically strong sequences. The authorization service has a flow that allows getting access to the Web UI without knowing credentials. A request smuggling attack can be performed on Varnish Cache servers by requesting that certain headers are made hop-by-hop, preventing the Varnish Cache servers from forwarding critical headers to the backend.Īn issue was discovered in Object First 1.0.7.712. Note: the 6.0.x LTS series (before 6.0.11) is affected.Īn issue was discovered in Varnish Cache 7.x before 7.1.2 and 7.2.x before 7.2.1. This could, in turn, be used to exploit vulnerabilities in a server behind the Varnish server. ![]() An attacker may introduce characters through HTTP/2 pseudo-headers that are invalid in the context of an HTTP/1 request line, causing the Varnish server to produce invalid HTTP/1 requests to the backend. For example, the attack payload could be placed in the Location header of an HTTP response with status code 302. ![]() ![]() Hostnames are often supplied by remote servers that could be controlled by a malicious actor in such a scenario, they could trigger excessive CPU consumption on the client attempting to make use of an attacker-supplied supposed hostname. An unnecessary quadratic algorithm exists in one path when processing some inputs to the IDNA (RFC 3490) decoder, such that a crafted, unreasonably long name being presented to the decoder could lead to a CPU denial of service. ![]() An issue was discovered in Python before 3.11.1. ![]()
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